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Abstract. Operation of critical infrastructures are highly interdepen-
dent on each other. Such dependencies causes failure in these infrastruc-
tures to cascade on an initial failure event. Owing to this vulnerability
it is imperative to incorporate efficient strategies for their protection.
Modifying dependencies by adding additional dependency implications
using entities (termed as auxiliary entities) is shown to mitigate this is-
sue to a certain extent. With this finding, in this article we introduce
the Auxiliary Entity Allocation problem. The objective is to maximize
protection in Power and Communication infrastructures using a bud-
get in number of dependency modifications using the auxiliary entities.
The problem is proved to be NP-complete in general case. We provide
an optimal solution using Integer Linear program and a heuristic for a
restricted case. The efficacy of heuristic with respect to the optimal is
judged through experimentation using real world data sets with heuristic
deviating 6.75% from optimal on average.
Keywords: Interdependent network, IIM Model, Auxiliary Entity, Dependency
Modification, K Most Vulnerable Entities.
1 Introduction
Critical infrastructures like power, communication, transportation networks etc.
interact symbiotically to carry out their functionalities. As an example there
exists strong mutual interactions between the power and communication net-
work or infrastructure (in this article the term infrastructure and network are
used interchangeably). Entities in the power network like generators, substations,
transmission lines etc. relies on control signals carried over by communication
network entities like routers, fiberoptic lines etc. Similarly all entities in the com-
munication network relies on power supply from the power network to drive their
functionalities. To capture this kind of dependencies the critical infrastructure
can be modeled as a multilayered interdependent network. Failure of entities in
either infrastructure impacts the operation of its own infrastructure as well as
the other infrastructure. Owing to these dependencies the initial failure might
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result in cascade of failures resulting in disastrous impact. This has been ob-
served in power blackouts which occurred in New York (2003) [1] and India
(2012) [11].
To study the nature of failure propagation in these interdependent networks
it is imperative to model their dependencies as accurately as possible. Recent
literature consists of a plethora of these models [4], [10], [5], [5], [10], [8], [12],
[7], [6], [3]. However each of these models have their own shortcoming in captur-
ing the complex dependencies that might exist. For example consider a scenario
with one power network entity a1 and three communication entities b1, b2, b3.
The entity a1 is operational provided that both entities b1 and b2 are oper-
ational or if entity b3 is operational (note that the italicized words represent
logical operations). None of the above models can accurately model this kind
of a dependency. Sen et. al. in [9] proposed a model that uses boolean logic to
capture these interdependencies. This model is referred to as the Implicative
Interdependency model (IIM)). To express the dependency of an entity on other
entities it uses implications which are disjunction(s) and conjunction(s) of logical
terms (denoting entities of the network). With respect to the example consid-
ered above the dependency implication for the entity a1 can be represented as
a1 ← b1b2 + b3. The boolean implication depicting the dependency is termed as
Inter-Dependency Relation. Our approach in designing solutions and analyzing
the problem addressed in this paper is based on the IIM model.
We restrict our attention to an interdependent power and communication
network in this paper. However the solutions can be extended to any two in-
terdependent networks. As discussed earlier initial failure of a certain entity set
in power and communication network may trigger cascading failure resulting in
loss of a large number of entities. Authors in [2] proposed the Entity Harden-
ing problem to increase the reliability of these interdependent systems. They
assumed that an entity when hardened would be resistant to both initial and
cascading failure. Given a set of entities that failed initially (that is at time t = 0)
the problem was to find a minimal set of entities which when hardened would
prevent failure of at least a predefined number of entities. On situations where
entity hardening is not possible alternative strategies needs to be employed to
increase the system reliability. Adding additional dependencies for entities in
interdependent infrastructure can be beneficial in this regard. We elaborate this
with the help of an example. Consider the dependency rule a1 ← b1b2 +b3. With
this dependency entity a1 would fail if entities (b1, b3) or (b2, b3) fails. Now con-
sider an entity b4 is added as a disjunction to the IDR (with the new dependency
being a1 ← b1b2 + b3 + b4). For entity a1 to fail, either (b1, b3, b4) or (b2, b3, b4)
should fail. This increases the reliability compared to the previous dependency
for a1. Hence adding additional dependency can be employed as a strategy when
entity hardening is not possible. Any entity added to modify a dependency rela-
tion is termed as an auxiliary entity. However due to system, cost and feasibility
constraints the number of such modifications are restricted. Hence when the
number of IDR modifications are restricted one has to find which IDRs to mod-
ify and with what entities so that the impact of failure is minimized. We term
this problem as the Auxiliary Entity Allocation Problem. It is to be noted that
in both Entity Hardening Problem and Auxiliary Entity Allocation Problem the
IDRs of the interdependent system are changed but these changes are carried
out differently.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief explanation of the
IIM model with formal problem definition is provided in Section 2. The com-
putational complexity of the problem and proposed solutions are discussed in
Sections 3 and 4 respectively. We discuss the experimental results in Section 5
and conclude the paper in Section 6
2 Problem Formulation using the Implicative
Interdependency Model
We briefly describe the IIM model introduced in [9]. Two sets A and B repre-
sent entities in power and communication network. The dependencies between
these set of entities are captured using a set of interdependency denoted as
F(A,B). Each function in the set F(A,B) is termed as an Inter-Dependency
Relation (IDR). We describe an interdependent network which composes of the
entity sets A and B and the interdependency relations F(A,B) and denote it by
I(A,B,F(A,B)). Through an example we explain this model further. Consider
an interdependent network I(A,B,F(A,B)) with A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5} and
B = {b1, b2, b3}. The set of IDRs (F(A,B)) for the interdependent network are
provided in Table 1. Consider the IDR a3 ← b2 + b1b3 in Table 1. It implies that
the entity a1 is operational if entity b2 or entity b1 and b3 are operational. As
evident, the IDRs are essentially disjunction(s) of entity (entities) in conjunc-
tive form. We refer to each conjunctive term, e.g. b1b3, as minterm. The example
considers dependencies where an entity in network A(B) is dependent on entities
in network B(A) i.e. inter-network dependency. However this model can capture
intra-network dependencies as well.
Power Network Comm. Network
a1 ← b1 + b2 b1 ← a2
a2 ← b1b2 b2 ← a2
a3 ← b2 + b1b3 b3 ← a4
a4 ← b3 −−
a5 −−
Table 1: IDRs for the constructed
example
Entities Time Steps (t)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
a1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
a2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a4 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
b2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
b3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 2: Cascade propagation when
entities {b2, b3} fail initially. 0 de-
notes the entity is operational and
1 non-operational
The cascading procedure is described with respect to the interdependent
network captured by IDRs in Table 1. The cascade proceeds in unit time steps
(denoted by t). Consider two entities b2 and b3 are attacked and made non
operational by an adversary at time step t = 0 (initial failure). Owing to the
IDRs a2 ← b1b2, a3 ← b2 + b1b3 and a4 ← b3 the entities a2, a3, a4 becomes non
operational at t = 1. Subsequently entities b1 (b1 ← a2) and a1 (a1 ← b1 + b2)
seize to operate at time step t = 2 and t = 3 respectively. The failure of entities
after t = 0 is termed as induced failure. The cascade is represented in Table 2.
It is to be noted that the maximum number of time steps in the cascade for any
interdependent network is |A| + |B| − 1 (assuming initial time step as t = 0).
Hence in Table 2 with number of entities being 8 the state (operational or non-
operational) of all entities are shown till t = 7. Construction of these IDRs is
a major challenge of this model. Possible strategies are (i) deep investigation of
physical properties and flows in the interdependent network and (ii) consultation
with domain experts. The methodology to construct these IDRs is ongoing and
is expected to be addressed in future. The problem in this article assumes that
the IDRs are already constructed for a given interdependent network.
Authors in [9] introduced the K most vulnerable entities problem. The prob-
lem used the IIM model to find a set of K (for a given integer |K|) entities in
an interdependent network I(A,B,F(A,B)) whose failure at time t = 0 (initial
failure) would result in failure of the largest number of entities due to induced
failure. For the example provided in this section consider the case where |K| = 2.
Failing entities b2 and b3 at t = 0 make entities {a1, a2, a3, a4, b1, b2, b3} not op-
erational by t = 3. Hence K = {b2, b3} are one of the 2 most vulnerable entities
in the interdependent network (it is possible to have multiple K most vulnerable
entities in an interdependent network). The set of entities failed when K most
vulnerable entities fail initially is denoted by A′ ∪B′ with A′ ⊆ A and B′ ⊆ B.
Here A′ = {a1, a2, a3, a4} and B′ = {b1, b2, b3}.
For a given K most vulnerable entities of an interdependent network, the
system reliability can be increased (i.e. entities can be protected from failure)
by Entity Hardening [2]. On scenarios where entity hardening is not possible it
is imperative to take alternative strategies. The number of entities failing due
to induced failure can be reduced by modifying the IDRs. One way of modifying
an IDR is adding an entity as a new minterm. For example, consider the inter-
dependent network with IDRs given by Table 1 and b2 and b3 being the 2 (when
K = 2) most vulnerable entities (as discussed above). Let the IDR b1 ← a2 be
modified as b1 ← a2 + a5. Hence the new interdependent network is represented
as I(A,B,F ′(A,B)) with the same set of IDRs as that in Table 1 except for IDR
b1 ← a2 + a5 as the sole modification. The entity a1 introduced is termed as an
auxiliary entity. It follows that after the modification, failure of entities b2 and
b3 at time t = 0 would trigger failure of entities a2, a3 and a4 only. Thus before
modification the failure set would have been {a1, a2, a3, a4, b1, b2, b3} and after
the modification it would be {a2, a3, a4, b2, b3}. Thus the modification would lead
to a fewer number of failures.
We make the following assumptions while modifying an IDR —
– It is possible to add an auxiliary entity as conjunction to a minterm. However
it is intuitive that this would have no impact in decreasing the number of
entities failed due to induced failure. Hence we modify an IDR by adding
only one auxiliary entity as a disjunction to a minterm
– An auxiliary entity does not have the capacity to make an entity operational
which fails due to initial failure. So to prune the search set for obtaining a
solution we discard entities in (A′ ∪B′) as possible auxiliary entities.
– If an IDR D is modified then it is done by adding only one entity not in
A′ ∪ B′ ∪ ED where ED is a set consisting of all entities (both on left and
right side of the equation) in D. For any IDR D ∈ F(A,B) we denote
AUX = (A ∪B)/(A′ ∪B′ ∪ ED) as the set of auxiliary entities that can be
used to modify D.
We quantify the number of modifications done as the number of IDRs to
which minterms are added as a disjunction. It should also be noted than an at-
tacker only have information about the initial interdependent network I(A,B,F(A,B)).
Hence with a budget of |K| it attacks and kills the K most vulnerable entities to
maximize the number of entities killed due to induced failure. Any modification
in the IDR is assumed to be hidden from the attacker.
With these definitions the Auxiliary Entity Allocation Problem (AEAP) is
defined as follows. Let K be the most vulnerable entities (already provided as in-
put) of an interdependent network I(A,B,F(A,B)). With a budget S in number
of modifications, the task is to find which are the S IDRs that are to be modified
and which entity should be used to perform this modification such that number
of entities failing due to induced failure is minimized. A more formal description
given below.
The Auxiliary Entity Allocation Problem (AEAP)
Instance — An interdependent network I(A,B,F(A,B)), K most vulnerable
entities for a given integer |K| and two positive integers S and Pf .
Decision Version — Does there exist S IDR auxiliary entity tuple (D,xi)
such that when each IDRs D ∈ F(A,B) is modified by adding auxiliary entity
xi ∈ AUX as a disjunction it would protect at least Pf entities from induced
failure with K vulnerable entities failing initially.
3 Computational Complexity Analysis
In this section we analyze the computational complexity of the AEAP problem.
The computational complexity of the problem depends on nature of the IDRs.
The problem is first solved by restricting the IDRs to have one minterm of size
1. For this special case a polynomial time algorithm exists for the problem. With
IDRs in general form the problem is proved to be NP-complete.
3.1 Special Case: Problem Instance with One Minterm of Size One
The special case consist of IDRs which have a single minterm of size 1 and each
entity appearing exactly once on the right hand side of the IDR. With entities
ai’s and bj ’s belonging to network A(B) and B(A) respectively, the IDRs can
be represented as ai ← bj . The AEAP problem can be solved in polynomial
time for this case. We first define Auxiliary Entity Protection Set and use it to
provide a polynomial time heuristic in Algorithm 1. The proof of optimality is
not included due to space constraint.
Definition 1. Auxiliary Entity Protection Set: With a given set of K most
vulnerable entities failing initially the Auxiliary Entity Protection Set is defined
as the number of entities protected from induced failure when an auxiliary en-
tity xi is added as a disjunction to an IDR D ∈ F(A,B). It is denoted as
AP (D,xi|K).
Algorithm 1: Algorithm solving AEAP problem for IDRs with minterms
of size 1
Data: An interdependent network I(A,B,F(A,B)) and set of K vulnerable
entities
Result: A set Dsol consisting of IDR auxiliary entity doubles (D,xi) (with
|Dsol| = S and Pf (denoting the entities protected from induced
failure)
1 begin
2 For each IDR D ∈ F(A,B) and each entity xi ∈ AUX (where
AUX = A ∪B/(A′ ∪B′ ∪ ED) as discussed in the previous section)
compute the Auxiliary Entity Protection Set AP (D,xi|K) ;
3 Initialize Dsol = ∅ and Pf = ∅;
4 while S 6= 0 do
5 Choose the Auxiliary Entity Protection Set with highest AP (xi, D|K).
In case of tie break arbitrarily. Let Dcur be the corresponding IDR and
xcur the auxiliary entity;
6 Update Dsol = Dsol ∪ (Dcur, xcur) and add auxiliary entity xcur as a
disjunction to the IDR Dcur ;
7 Update Pf = Pf ∪AP (Dcur, xcur|K);
8 for ∀ IDR D′ ∈ F(A,B) and xi ∈ AUX of D′ do
9 Update AP (D′, xi|K) = AP (D′, xi|K)\AP (Dcur, xcur|K);
10 S ← S − 1;
11 return Dsol and Pf ;
3.2 General Case: Problem Instance with an Arbitrary Number of
Minterms of Arbitrary Size
The IDRs in general are composed of disjunctions of entities in conjunctive form
i.e. arbitrary number of minterms of arbitrary size. This case can be represented
as ai ←
∑p
k1=1
∏jk1
j=1 bj where entities ai and b
′
js belong to network A(B) and
B(A) respectively. The given example has p minterms each of size jk1 . In Theo-
rem 1 we prove that the decision version of the AEAP problem for general case
is NP complete.
Theorem 1. The decision version of the AEAP problem for Case IV is NP-
complete.
Proof. The hardness is proved by a reduction from Set Cover problem. An in-
stance of a set cover problem consists of a universe U = {x1, x2, ..., xn} of el-
ements and set of subsets S = {S1, S2, ..., Sm} where each element Si ∈ S is
a subset of U . Given an integer X the set cover problem finds whether there
are ≤ X elements in S whose union is equal to U . From an instance of the
set cover problem we create an instance of the AEAP problem. For each subset
Si we create an entity bi and add it to set B. For each element xj in U we
add an entity aj to a set A1. We have a set A2 of entities where |A2| = |B|. Let
A2 = {a21, a22, ..., a2|B|} where there is an association between entity bj and a2j .
Additionally we have a set of entities A3 with |A3| = X which does not have
any dependency relation of its own. The set A is comprised of A1∪A2∪A3. The
IDRs are created as follows. For an element xi that appears in subsets Sx, Sy, Sz,
an IDR ai ← bx + by + bz is created. For each entity bj ∈ B an IDR bj ← a2j is
added to F(A,B). The cardinality of K most vulnerable node is set to |A2| and
it directly follows that K = A2 comprises the set of most vulnerable entities. The
value of S (number of IDR modifications) is set to X and Pf is set to S + |A1|.
Let there exist a solution to the set cover problem. Then there exist at least
X subsets whose union covers the set U . For each subset Sk which is in the
solution of the set cover problem we choose the corresponding entity bk. Let B
′
be all such entities. We arbitrarily choose and add an entity from A3 to each IDR
bk ← a2k with bk ∈ B′ to form S = X distinct IDR auxiliary entity doubles. As
A3 type entities does not have any dependency relation thus all the entities in
B that correspond to the subsets in the solution will be protected from failure.
Additionally protecting these B type entities would ensure all entities in A1
does not fail as well (as there exists at least one B type entity in the IDR of A1
type entities which is operational). Hence a total of X + |A1| are protected from
failure.
Similarly let there exist a solution to the AEAP problem. It can be checked
easily that no entities in B∪A1∪A2 has the ability to protect additional entities
using IDR modification. Hence set A3 can only be used as auxiliary entities. An
entity from A3 for the created instance can be added to an IDR of A1 type entity
or B type entity. In the former strategy only one entity is protected from failure
whereas two entities are operational when we add auxiliary entity to IDRs of
B type entities. Hence all the auxiliary entities are added to the B type IDRs
with a final protection of X + |A1| entities. For each IDR of the B type entity to
which the auxiliary entity is added, the corresponding subset in S is chosen. The
union of these subsets would result in U as the solution of the AEAP problem
protects the failure of all A1 type entities. Hence solving the set cover problem
and proving the hardness stated in Theorem 1.
4 Solutions to the AEAP Problem
We consider the following restricted case where there exists at least S entities in
the interdependent network which does not belong to any of the failing entities.
This comprise the set of auxiliary entities that can be used. It is also imperative
to use such set as auxiliary entities because they never fail from induced or
initial failure when the K most vulnerable entities fail initially. The problem still
remains to be NP compete for this case as in Theorem 1 the set of entities A3
belong to such class of auxiliary entities. With these definition of the special
case let A denote a set of such auxiliary entities which can be used for IDR
modifications with A ⊂ A ∪ B/(A′′ ∪ B′′) (where A′′ ∪ B′′ are the entities that
fails due to failing entities A′ cupB′ initially). Hence we loose the notion of
IDR auxiliary entity doubles in the solution as any auxiliary entity from set A
would produce the same protection effect. Let A denote all such entities that
can be used as auxiliary entities as defined above. We additionally assume that
|A| ≥ S, i.e., there are enough auxiliary entities to suffice the AEAP budget S.
So in both the solutions we only consider the IDRs that needs to be modified and
disregard which auxiliary entity is used for this modification. We first propose an
Integer Linear Program (ILP) to obtain the optimal solution in this setting. We
later provide a polynomial heuristic solution to the problem. The performance
of heuristic with respect to the ILP is compared in the section to follow.
4.1 Optimal solution to AEAP problem
We first define the variables used in formulating the ILP. Two set of variables
G = {g1, g2, ..., gc} and H = {h1, h2, ..., hd} (with c = |A| and d = |B|) are
used to maintain the solution of K most vulnerable entities. Any variable gi ∈ G
(hj ∈ H) is equal to 1 if ai ∈ A (bj ∈ B) belongs to K and is 0 otherwise.
For each entity ai and bj a set of variables xid and yjd are introduced with
0 ≤ d ≤ |A|+ |B| − 1. xid (yid) is set to 1 if the entity ai (bj) is non operational
at time step d and is 0 otherwise. Let P denote the total number of IDRs in
the interdependent network and assume each IDR has a unique label between
numbers from 1 to P . A set of variables M = {m1,m2, ...,mP } are introduced.
The value of mi is set to 1 if an auxiliary node is added as a disjunction to the
IDR labeled i and 0 otherwise. With these definitions we define the objective
function and the set of constraints in the ILP.
min
( |A|∑
i=1
xi(|A|+|B|−1) +
|B|∑
j=1
yj(|A|+|B|−1)
)
(1)
The objective function defined in 1 tries to minimize the number of entities
having value 1 at the end of the cascade i.e. time step |A| + |B| − 1. Explicitly
this objective minimizes the number of entities failed due to induced failure.
The constraints that are imposed on these objective to capture the definition of
AEAP are listed below —
Constraint Set 1: xi0 ≥ gi and yj0 ≥ hj . This imposes the criteria that if entity
ai (bj) belongs to the K most vulnerable entity set then the corresponding vari-
able xi0 (yj0) is set to 1 capturing the initial failure.
Constraint Set 2: xid ≥ xi(d−1),∀d, 1 ≤ d ≤ |A|+|B|−1, and yid ≥ yi(d−1),∀d, 1 ≤
d ≤ |A|+|B|−1,. This ensures that the variable corresponding to an entity which
fails at time step t would have value 1 for all d ≥ t.
Constraint Set 3: We use the theory developed in [9] to generate constraints
to represent the cascade through the set of IDRs. To describe this consider an
IDR ai ← bjbpbl+bmbn+bq in the interdependent network. Assuming the IDR is
labeled v it is reformulated as ai ← bjbpbl + bmbn + bq +mv with mv ∈M . This
is done for all IDRs. The constraint formulation is described in the following
steps.
Step 1: All minterms of size greater than 1 are replaced with a single virtual
entity. In this example we introduce two virtual entities C1 and C2 (C1, C2 /∈
A∪B) capturing the IDRs C1 ← bjbpbl and C2 ← bmbn. The IDR in the example
can be then transformed as ai ← C1 +C2 + bq +mv. For any such virtual entity
Ck a set of variables ckd are added with ckd = 1 if Ck is alive at time step d
and 0 otherwise. Hence all the IDRs are represented as disjunction(s) of single
entities. Similarly all virtual entities have IDRs which are conjunction of single
entities.
Step 2: For a given virtual entity Ck and all entities having a single midterm
of arbitrary size, we add constraints to capture the cascade propagation. Let
N denote the number of entities in the IDR of Ck. The constraints added is
described through the example stated above. The variable c1 with IDR C1 ←
bjbpbl, constraints c1d ≥ yj(d−1)+yp(d−1)+yl(d−1)N and c1d ≤ yj(d−1) + yp(d−1) +
yl(d−1)∀d, 1 ≤ d ≤ m + n− 1 are added (with N = 3 in this case). This ensures
that if any entity in the conjunction fails the corresponding virtual entity fails
as well.
Step 3: In the transformed IDRs described in step 1 let n denote the num-
ber of entities in disjunction for any given IDR (without modification). In the
given example with IDR ai ← C1 + C2 + bq + mv, constraints of form xid ≥
c1(d−1)+c2(d−1)+yq(d−1)+mv−(n−1) and xid ≤ c1(d−1)+c2(d−1)+yq(d−1)+mvn ∀d, 1 ≤
d ≤ m + n− 1 are added. This ensures that the entity ai will fail only if all the
entities in disjunction become non operational.
Constraint Set 4: To ensure that only S auxiliary entities are added as dis-
junction to the IDRs constraint
∑P
v=1mv = S is introduced.
4.2 Heuristic solution to the AEAP problem
In this section we provide a polynomial heuristic solution to the AEAP problem.
We first redenote Auxiliary Entity Protection Set as AP (D|K) as it is immaterial
which entity is added as an auxiliary entity since no auxiliary entity can fail due
to any kind of failure. Along with the definition of Auxiliary Entity Protection
Set, we define Auxiliary Cumulative Fractional Minterm Hit Value (ACFMHV)
for designing the the heuristic. We first define Auxiliary Fractional Minterm
Hit Value (AFMHV) in Definition 2 which is used in defining ACFMHV (in
Definition 3).
Definition 2. The Auxiliary Fractional Minterm Hit Value of an IDR D ∈
F(A,B) is denoted by AFMHV (D|K). It is calculated as AFMHV (D|K) =∑m
i=1
1
|si| . Let xj denote the entity in the right hand side of the IDR D and
m denotes all the minterms in which the entity xj appears over all IDRs. The
parameter si denotes i
th such minterm with |si| being its size. If an auxiliary
entity is placed at D then the value computed above provides an estimate implicit
impact on protection of other non operational entities.
Definition 3. The Auxiliary Cumulative Fractional Minterm Hit Value of an
IDR D ∈ F(A,B) is denoted by ACFMHV (D). It is computed as ACFMHV (D) =
∑
∀xi∈AP (D|K)AFMHV (Dxi |K) where Dxi is the IDR for entity xi ∈ AP (D|K).
The impact produced by the protected entities when IDR D is allocated with an
auxiliary entity over set A ∪B is implicitly provided by this definition.
Algorithm 2: Heuristic solution to the AEAP problem
Data: An interdependent network I(A,B,F(A,B)), set of K vulnerable
entities, set A of auxiliary entities and budget S
1 . Result: A set Dsol consisting of IDRs (with |Dsol| = S to each of which an
auxiliary entity is added as a disjunction and Pf (denoting the entities
protected from induced failure)
2 begin
3 Initialize Dsol = ∅ and Pf = ∅;
4 while S 6= 0 do
5 For each IDR D ∈ F(A,B) compute the Auxiliary Node Protection Set
AP (D|K) ;
6 if There exists multiple IDRs having same value of highest cardinality of
the set AP (D|K) then
7 For each IDR D ∈ F(A,B) compute the Auxiliary Cumulative
Fractional Minterm Hit Value ACFMHV (D) ;
8 Let Dp be an IDR having highest ACFMHV (Dp) among all Di’s in
the set of IDRs having highest cardinality of the set AP (Di|K);
9 If there is a tie choose arbitrarily;
10 Update Dsol = Dsol ∪Dp and add an auxiliary entity from A as a
disjunction to the IDR Dp;
11 Update Pf = Pf ∪AP (Dp);
12 Update A by removing the auxiliary entity added ;
13 S ← S − 1;
14 else
15 Let Dp be an IDR having highest cardinality of the set D ∈ F(A,B);
16 Update Dsol = Dsol ∪Dp and add an auxiliary entity from A as a
disjunction to the IDR Dp;
17 Update Pf = Pf ∪AP (Dp|K);
18 Update A by removing the auxilary entity added ;
19 S ← S − 1;
20 Prune the interdependent network I(A,B,F(A,B) by removing the
IDRs for entities in AP (Dp|K) and removing the same set of entities
from A ∪B ;
21 return Dsol and Pf ;
The heuristic is provided in Algorithm 2. At any given iteration the auxiliary
entity is placed at the IDR which protects the most number of entities from
failure. In case of a tie the entity having highest ACFMHV value is chosen. At any
given iteration the algorithm greedily maximize the number of entities protected
from induced failure. Algorithm 2 runs in polynomial time, more specifically the
time complexity is O(Sn(n + m)2) (where n = |A| + |B| and m = Number of
minterms in F(A,B)).
(a) Region 1 (b) Region 2
(c) Region 3 (d) Region 4
Fig. 1: Comparison of the number of entities protected in optimal solution (ILP)
and heuristic in each of the 5 identified regions with |K| = 8 and number of
auxiliary entities (or modifications) varied as 1, 3, 5, 7
5 Experimental Results
The solution of the heuristic is compared with the ILP to judge its efficacy. We
perform the experiments on real world data sets with the IDRs generated ar-
tificially based on some predefined rules. Platts (www.platss.com) and GeoTel
(www.geo-tel.com) provided the power and communication network data respec-
tively. The power network data consisted of two types of entity — 70 power plants
and 470 transmission lines. There are three types of entity in the communica-
tion network data — 2,690 cell towers, 7,100 fiber-lit buildings and 42,723 fiber
links. The data corresponds to the Maricopa county region of Arizona, USA.
To perform the experimental analysis we picked four non overlapping regions
in Maricopa county. They are labelled as Region 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. It
is to be noted that the union of these regions does not cover the entry county.
For each region we filtered out the entities from our dataset and constructed the
IDRs based on rules defined in [9].
The cardinality of K most vulnerable nodes was set to 8 and was calculated
using the ILP described in [9]. The number nodes failed in each region due to
initial failure of the most vulnerable nodes are 28, 23, 28, 28 respectively. We vary
the number of auxiliary entities placed (or modifications) from 1 to 7 in steps
of 2. For each region and modification budget the number of entities protected
from failure for the heuristic was compared with the ILP solution and is plotted
in Figure 1. The maximum possible percentage difference of the heuristic from
optimal for any region and modification budget pair is observed to be a 11.76%
in Region 3 with 5 auxiliary entities (Figure 1c). On an average the heuristic
performed very near to the optimal with a difference of 6.75%.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we introduce the auxiliary entity allocation problem in multilayer
interdependent network using the IIM model. Entities in multilayer network can
be protected from an initial failure event when auxiliary entities are used to
modify the IDRs. With a budget on the number of modifications, the problem
is proved to be NP-complete. We provide an optimal solution using ILP and
polynomial heuristic for a restricted case of the problem. The optimal solution
was compared with the heuristic on real world data sets and on an average
deviates 6.75% from the optimal.
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